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This paper gives an overview of bioeconomic modelling of marine reserves, and 
illustrates how economists have responded to the modelling results found in the 
ecological literature. The economic analysis is shown to be far more pessimistic with 
regard to the potential of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool, than what 
one finds in the purely ecological analysis, the reason being the latter’s neglect of 
issues such as discounting and economic incentive behaviour. However, the economic 
analysis, despite some of it being relatively advanced with regard to spatiality, is still 
simplistic with regard to for instance ecosystem and habitat content. A simple 
expansion of the existing bioeconomic models with regard to positive habitat effects 
of area closures is presented and analysed, showing room for improved results from 
marine reserve implementation as compared to existing analysis.  
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Introduction 
Marine reserves1 have become one of the hot topics in marine management with 
proponents in most camps. Biological research on the topic has exploded since it re-
emerged in the late 1980s (Conover et al. 2000), after Beverton and Holt (1957) laid 
closed areas on the back burner, and instead directed the focus upon gear restrictions 
and fishing intensity. Economic research on marine reserves is, however, 
comparatively new and of a much more limited quantity, though increasing rapidly. In 
this note the economic critique of the biological approach to marine reserves is 
presented, while at the same time also adding to the standard bioeconomic model in 
order to open for broader ecosystem considerations as demanded by ecologists.  
 
Fisheries economists have traditionally concentrated on issues concerning 
management of commercially important species, and have tended to focus on one or 
perhaps two-species models (for some exceptions to this see Flaaten 1988, Eide and 
Flaaten 1998), leaving the broader issue of biodiversity to more general ecological-
economic research. In recent years, however, there has been a growing worry that 
marine resources are being rapidly decimated (Botsford et al. 1997, Myers and Worm 
2003, Jackson, et al. 2003). Resulting concern for the biodiversity in the oceans has 
awakened policy-makers as well as researchers in many fields, and the fact that 
fisheries management now must move from a single-species focus to a biodiversity 
focus has been underlined (Hanna 1999).  However, fisheries economics research 
does not seem to have taken this step yet. One topic that has emerged where 
biodiversity and commercial fisheries could meet is in management options such as 
marine reserves. Fisheries economists started publishing work on marine reserves 
towards the end of the 90s, showing an increasing interest for the topic, and often a 
slightly different approach and attitude to that of the ecologists. Economists have 
usually been more critical to marine reserves as a fisheries management option than 
the ecologists (see Hannesson 1998, Smith and Wilen, 2003). However, the economic 
analysis is still to a large degree done by applying single-species systems (see 
however Bonceur et al. 2002 and Reithe, 2006), with issues of biodiversity or habitat 
seldom being included (see however Rodwell et al. 2003, Schnier 2005, and Upton 
                                                          
1 In the literature a large number of different expressions are used to describe closures of areas in the 
oceans. In this work marine reserves and marine protected areas (MPAs) are used interchangeably to 
describe permanently closed areas to some or all human activity.  
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and Sutinen, 2003). This work attempts to add to the existing bioeconomic analysis by 
taking into account habitat effects of marine reserve implementation. A simple habitat 
improvement feature is presented in an accepted bioeconomic marine reserve model, 
showing improved results from marine reserve implementation as compared to 
existing models. This accentuates the need for further integration of ecology and 
economics in the study of ocean management. 
 
The advantage of reserves from a biodiversity point of view is clear – an area 
undisturbed will presumably over time regain some form of natural equilibrium and 
secure biodiversity at least within the reserve. Positive biodiversity effects for the area 
outside the reserve could be through migration or density dependent dispersal, or the 
fact that the reserve may function as a buffer to shocks to the system (see Conrad 
1999 and Sumaila 1998, and also Hannesson’s 2002 more critical comment).  The 
advantages of reserves for commercial fisheries are usually presented as the increased 
fish production migrating out of reserves. The norm has been to focus on some form 
of density dependent dispersal in the economic literature (Hannesson, 1998, 
Sanchirico and Wilen, 1999, 2001) but also to some degree in the biological literature 
(Hastings and Botsford, 1999). But, as Gell and Roberts (2003) point out, very little is 
known regarding density dependent dispersal. The limited amount of empirical work 
done does however not preclude the possibility that density dependent dispersal 
exists, and density dependent influences are still clearly important (MacCall, 1990), 
but presumably more relevant as regards spawning, recruitment and cannibalism. 
Though some work has been done on differing habitats and marine reserves (Schnier 
2005)2, habitat effects of reserves have received scant attention (see however, 
Rodwell et al. 2003 and Upton and Sutinen 2003).3 It is clear that commercial 
fisheries do impact upon marine habitats (see Auster and Langton 1999 for an 
overview), and this needs to be accounted for in economic analysis.  In this paper a 
standard bioeconomic marine reserve model is expanded upon by allowing habitat 
enhancing effects, depending on the size of the reserve (see Halpern 2003 for a 
discussion of reserve size and biological effects). These effects come in the shape of 
changes in carrying capacity (as suggested in Roberts and Sargant, 2002), and could 
                                                          
2 Much of the bioeconomic literature on marine reserves allows for differing growth and carrying 
capacity, but little attention is given explicitly to this issue prior to Schnier (2005).  
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well be deleterious (as described by Skonhoft and Armstrong, 2005 and Armstrong 
and Skonhoft, 2005). The intuition behind positive effects is that closing areas to 
fishing allows improved habitat for protection of young and spawning, as well as 
increased prey abundance (Auster and Malatesta, 1995, Garcia-Charton and Perez-
Ruzafa, 1999, Roberts and Sargant, 2002).  
 
This paper first presents the ecological-economic research on marine reserves, and 
shows the lack of ecosystems or habitats in these models. A bioeconomic habitat 
enhancing model of a marine reserve is presented in the second section, followed by 
the results and comparison between different management options. In conclusion the 
paper discusses the results and reflects more generally over the integration of 
ecological and economic knowledge in models of marine reserves. 
 
 
Bioeconomic modelling and marine reserves 
Ecological research on marine reserves is generally more positive to this management 
option than the economic research is, with Bohnsack (1993) summing up much of the 
former groups’ optimism, stating that marine reserves will protect resources, enhance 
fisheries and even solve conflicts. Economists question all these issues as well as 
others in different studies which will be reviewed below. 
 
Discounting the future 
One of the earliest problems that economists have pointed to as regards marine 
reserves is the issue of time. Also biologists have underlined the trade-off between 
short term profits from fisheries versus possible long term gains from risk reduction 
of marine reserves (Dayton et al. 2000). This is however explicitly studied in Holland 
and Brazee’s (1996) dynamic bioeconomic analysis where the discount rate of those 
affected by a reserve implementation, and their minimum production requirements, 
are critical with regards to policy decisions on marine reserves. If society discounts 
the future to a large degree, possible gains from marine reserves a long time ahead 
will not pay for the loss in economic activity today. The consequences for policy- 
making are well known from the global warming debate surrounding the Kyoto 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Studies of terrestrial reserves and increased carrying capacity have however been made (see Carroll et 
al. 2003, Song and Li 1995 and Warkentin et al. 1995) 
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Protocol. Hence the “bounce-back” propensity of chosen marine reserve areas 
compared to society’s rate of discount, will determine whether marine reserve policy 
as a fisheries management option will successfully win through. 
 
Uncertainty 
Natures’ ability to “bounce back” naturally brings us to the issue of uncertainty, 
which is also of interest from an economic viewpoint. It has been hypothesised that 
marine reserves could insure against environmental shocks, or function as a “hedge 
against inevitable management limitations” (Lauck et al. 1998). Sumaila (2002) 
applied a  Beverton-Holt bioeconomic simulation model and found that the 
implementation of a reserve may indeed protect discounted economic rent. This 
model assumes, however, that the shock only occurs in the fishable area. Conrad 
(1999), using a Gordon-Schaefer model assumes a more general shock to the system, 
and finds that marine reserves do succeed in reducing biomass variation, but also 
reduce harvests and thereby economic rents as compared to a private property 
management without a reserve. 
 
Management options outside the reserve 
Since Gordon’s (1954) seminal work, economists have criticised open access 
fisheries, as the effect of profits to attract fishers in unmanaged fisheries leads to 
excessive effort investment, which decimates the profit, even in the presence of 
marine reserves. In the analysis of marine reserves, many economists have pointed to 
this fact (Holland and Brazee, 1996), and also shown that perfectly applied private 
property management without reserves will better take care of both stocks and 
harvests, unless marine reserves are exceedingly large (Hannesson, 1998). It is clearly 
not fair to assume that in fisheries with a high degree of sophisticated management, 
the implementation of marine reserves will eradicate all other management except 
perhaps access (see references to limited-entry management and marine reserves 
below).  Much work still remains, therefore, with regards to the analysis of different 
management options than solely open and limited access outside marine reserves.  
 
Reduced management costs 
It has been claimed that marine reserves in industrialised fisheries may be cheaply 
monitored via satellite systems, thereby reducing management costs. Bioeconomic 
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analysis including management costs (Armstrong and Reithe 2001) has indeed shown 
that the introduction of marine reserves has the potential to reduce the reserve size 
that will give equal stock and harvest results as that of private property management 
without a reserve. However, existing reserves are most common in tropical waters 
with greater prevalence of subsistence fisheries, where unless there is community 
acceptance, the monitoring costs are prohibitive. There are however very few existing 
reserves in fisheries where one could expect reduced management costs, such as for 
instance in highly industrialised fisheries with for instance satellite monitoring. We do 
however see increasing pressure for the implementation of marine reserves in areas 
with high degree of industrial fishing activity, where remote sensing and closed areas 
could potentially reduce management costs. 
 
Reduced conflict 
It has been claimed that marine reserve implementation will somehow reduce 
conflicts at sea (Bohnsack 1993), presumably by zoning, and separating different 
interest groups in the ocean. The many conflicting opinions that have arisen prior to 
reserve implementation in for instance California may not be an indication of the 
climate after a reserve implementation, but it definitely begs the question of how a 
shrunken area of use will reduce conflict among a given group of agents. Sumaila and 
Armstrong (2006), using a one-species cohort model with two harvesting groups 
fishing on different age groups within the stock in question, show how there may be 
clear disagreement between the two groups as regards marine reserve size and 
fisheries management implementation. This result is underlined in Holland’s (2000) 
applied model of multi-species and multi-agent fisheries on Georges Bank. Via 
simulations it is shown that some groups of fishers obtain increased yields from 
permanent marine reserves, while others obtain reduced yields.  
 
“Double Payoff” 
So far we have mainly discussed work that focuses on simple two-patch models. 
Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2001) introduce greater degree of spatiality into 
bioeconomic models of marine reserves. They show that economic results are highly 
dependent upon the type of interaction between different patches, and which patch is 
closed. This due to complex spatial and intertemporal effort redistribution effects. 
Hence both economic and biological factors affect the results of reserve 
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implementation. The authors (op. cit.) identify circumstances which would afford 
what they call a “double payoff”, namely increased aggregate biomass and aggregate 
harvest by closing one or more areas to exploitation. They find that, given open access 
outside reserve patches, biological benefits may be forthcoming from reserve 
implementation, but few combinations of biological and economic parameters give 
both increased aggregate harvests and aggregate biomass.  
 
Human behaviour 
A central critique made by economists of biologists’ work is how the latter include 
human behaviour. In most biological models of marine reserves, effort is assumed 
exogenously given and constant (Man et al. 1995, Carr and Reed 1993). Economists 
see this as an overly strong assumption and underline the incentive effects that fishers 
react to. Smith and Wilen (2003), use an applied, spatially and behaviourally explicit, 
dynamic bioeconomic model of a specific fishery, the sea urchin fishery in northern 
California, which they compare to a pure biological model with standard simplifying 
assumptions regarding human behaviour, i.e. in effect ignoring economic incentive 
behaviour. They demonstrate that the optimistic conclusions regarding reserves found 
in ecological work may well be a result of the simplified assumptions ignoring 
economic behaviour. Furthermore, the preferred areas to close vary greatly for the two 
models analysed. 
 
Which areas should be closed? 
What does the economic research say about which fisheries and areas to close in the 
case of reserve implementation? Holland and Brazee (1996) show that only fisheries 
with a high degree of effort already present will gain from reserves. This is also a 
result found in Holland’s (2000) applied work, as well as biological modelling (see 
the review in Gerber et al. 2003). Hence fisheries that manage to control effort by 
other means are best left alone. Sanchirico and Wilen (2001) find that given open 
access conditions, closing the most profitable high productivity patch provides the 
greatest chance of increased aggregate harvests. This is due to the fact that under open 
access, the most profitable area is overexploited, and hence fits into Holland and 
Brazee’s (1996) definition of high effort levels.  Introducing limited-entry 
management changes these results. In this case Sanchirico and Wilen (2002) show 
that the closure of lower productivity areas gives higher values in the fishery, as the 
 9
high productivity areas under limited-entry already without reserves give large 
returns. The opportunity cost of closing such areas is thus high. Hence closing low 
productivity and high cost areas may lead to increased profitability in a limited-entry 
fishery. This underlines the importance of the status quo in a fishery prior to reserve 
implementation, and also points a finger at one of the most usual determinants for 
reserve area choice, namely natural productivity. Once the economics of a managed 
fishery is taken into account, areas less attractive are more advantageously closed. 
This is often in direct conflict with what we see in actual reserve management as well 
as suggestions from biologists (Garcia-Charton and Perez-Ruzafa 1999). 
 
Bycatch fisheries 
Bycatch fisheries are by many economists seen as the type of fishery that will best 
gain from marine reserve implementation. This is however a topic that has not been 
sufficiently studied4, though Reithe (2006) shows numerically in a two-species model 
that the type of ecological interaction between the two species influence the 
possibility of actually protecting a bycatch species through the use of a reserve. The 
ecological interaction also affects the possibility of obtaining a win-win situation 
when implementing a reserve, and also determines the optimal patch to close. 
Ecosystem modelling is not prevalent in bioeconomic research as of yet, but marine 
reserves as a fisheries management tool seems like a natural place for such research to 
emerge. Bonceour et al. (2002) apply a two-species, two-area model of marine 
reserve implementation. One stock is a commercially interesting prey species while 
the other stock is a non-commercial predator. They show that interactions between 
species may reduce benefits to the fishing industry of reserve implementation, but on 
the positive side create opportunities for eco-tourism development.  
 
Applied bioeconomic modelling work on marine reserves is limited, but one of the 
few examples that does exist, Holland’s (2000) multi-species, multi-fishery 
bioeconomic model of Georges Bank brings out a critique of the perhaps most often 
supposed positive result of marine reserve implementation, namely increased stock 
sizes (see however Parrish (1999) for a similar argument from a biologist). In this 
work he shows that in a situation where fisher’s react to area closures in an 
                                                          
4 Also on the biological side, models with more than one species are scarce (Gerber et al. 2003). 
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economically sound fashion, resulting fishing may actually increase the danger of 
depletion for some fish stocks. This is clearly a warning regarding how we design 
marine reserves.  
 
So far, however, almost all modelling of marine reserves in economics rests upon the 
driving force of density dependent migration. Density dependent migration is highly 
probable, but nonetheless not demonstrated (Gell and Roberts 2003). This begs the 
question of possible alternative advantages of marine reserves, such as how possible 
habitat improvement as a result of closed areas will affect the harvests and profits. 
Issues such as the “shifting baseline syndrome” (Pauly 1995), and the question of 
whether applied carrying capacities are large enough, or should be revised for marine 
reserves is clearly an issue that would affect some model results. Here is a clear 
ecological input which may affect the bioeconomic results with regards to marine 
reserves. This issue is discussed in the following. 
 
 
Modeling habitat effects of marine reserves 
In economic analysis of marine reserves so far, studies have had a single-species 
focus (see however Bonceur et al. 2002 and Reithe, 2006), and issues of biodiversity 
have not been given economic weight. A model that takes inherent values of 
ecosystems into account could be one way to remedy this, for instance by giving 
species biomass or density economic weight and value (Skonhoft and Johannesen, 
2000, used a similar model in a study of reindeer herding). The object would be to 
maximize the total value of habitat use:  
Max ∏(h,S) = ω∏(h,S) + (1-ω)∏(S) 
where ∏(h,S) are profits from harvesting h, which also depend on stock size S, and 
∏(S) are profits and valuations tied to the biodiversity or density S of production in 
the relevant area. ∏(S) could be profits connected to tourism, which would be 
dependent upon the biodiversity or the density of natural production in the area of 
interest. Alternatively, or additionally, ∏(S) could incorporate non-use values 
(Skonhoft, 1999). ω is a weighting parameter giving the relative weight attributed to 
the two forms of value emanating from the habitat in question. The issues of 
determining ω could be solved in a way similar to Munro’s (1979) method of finding 
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the weighting parameter between the profits of two countries harvesting a common 
fish stock, i.e. applying for instance the Nash bargaining solution.  
 
A few bioeconomic papers have discussed habitat quality and reserves. Schnier 
(2005) models heterogeneity of habitats, but does not include how the implementation 
of reserves can affect this quality. Rodwell et al. (2003) study positive and negative 
fisheries effects as a function of time with a reserve in place; the positive effects 
emanating from reduced natural mortality and the negative being reduction in spatial 
movement out of the reserve, both due to improved habitat within the reserve. Upton 
and Sutinen (2003) model reduction in the habitat growth dependent upon fishing, 
which feeds into intrinsic growth and carrying capacity of the fish species in question.   
A different model that takes into account habitat effects of marine reserves could be 
analysed by modifying the carrying capacity K of the logistic growth function5.  
 
In the following we will study a simple model of carrying capacity being affected by 
reserve size6, in keeping with existing bioeconomic models on marine reserves, hence 
allowing comparison. 
 
The model is based on  Hannesson’s (1998) marine reserve model, though in this 
paper  stock entities are studied, rather than densities as Hannesson (op. cit)7. To this 
basic model is added a possible habitat effect of marine reserve implementation. One 
type of habitat effect is opened for, namely that carrying capacity in the reserve 
depends on marine reserve size. The following four management regimes are studied;  
 
- Open access  
- Private property 
- Marine reserve  
- Marine reserve with habitat effects  
 
                                                          
5 Alternatively the intrinsic growth rate of the logistic function could be modelled as being habitat 
dependent, as this will have a different effect upon long run stock size and optimal harvesting effort as 
compared to that of the carrying capacity.  
6 Armstrong et al. (2004) analyse a hypothetical marine reserve for the North-East Atlantic cod stock 
applying a more complex version of the carrying capacity habitat effect presented below. They show 
that given modest habitat effects, a marine reserve for a migratory species such as cod may well be 
economically advantageous. 
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We will start by defining the model for the marine reserve, assuming that it is always 
combined with open access outside the reserve, i.e. effort enters where allowed as 
long as there exists positive profits in the fishery. The private property regime ensures 
profit or rent maximization, without a reserve. On the other end of the scale is a pure 
open access regime. Hence these two standard management options are compared 
with marine reserve management with and without habitat effects. Habitat effects as 
the result of the implementation of a marine protected area will be described in the 
following. 
 
The resource in question is uniformly distributed over a homogeneous area. K is the 
carrying capacity in the total area. A fraction m, 0 < m < 1, of the total area 
determines the reserve size, making (1-m) the fraction of the total area found outside 
the reserve. Hence the basic carrying capacity within the reserve is mK, and the 
carrying capacity outside the reserve is (1-m)K.  The rate with which fish move 
between the two areas, or in this context the dispersal parameter, is defined as z. It is 
assumed that for a positive m, i.e. reserve, there is an addition to the basic carrying 
capacity within the reserve, as total carrying capacity in the reserve is affected by the 
carrying capacity habitat effect g(m)8. We assume that g’> 0, and g’’≤ 0. Thus, total 
carrying capacity increases for increased reserve size, but at a constant or decreasing 
rate9.  
 
This makes the total carrying capacity in the reserve equal to;  
mK +g(m)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Anderson (2002) and Conrad (1999) use models similar to the basic model applied here.  
8 We assume that only the carrying capacity in the reserve is affected by the size of the area closure. 
Hence there is an underlying assumption that the outside area’s habitat is either in such a condition or 
of such a character that any change in effort that may occur from reserve implementation does not 
affect it to any greater degree. This seems like an acceptable assumption in cases where there is 
extensive prior fishing activity, or where the habitat outside the reserve is of a kind that is not affected 
substantially by fishing effort. 
9 Carrying capacity could also be dependent upon the reserve shape, in the sense that large dispersal z 
may describe a reserve shape that gives a large reserve boarder line (as described by Flaaten and 
Mjølhus, 2005), while low z defines a more compact reserve.  This may clearly be an issue with regard 
to protection of genetic base, in the sense that a reserve shape that allows for large dispersal out of a 
reserve, irregardless of size, will not to the same degree protect attributes of individual fish that may 
make them desirable from a commercial point of view, or for sustaining large stock levels (Trexler and 
Travis 2000).  
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The aggregate resource biomass, if we have a biodiversity perspective, or single stock 
size in the simpler context, is described by Xi, with i=M,O, denoting the marine 
reserve and the outside area respectively. The rate of change in biomass in the 
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The first term on the right hand side of (1) describes the growth in the fishable area, 
while the second term expresses the net migration to the fishable area, and Y is the 
harvest. The net migration expressions are determined by the relative densities of fish 
in the two areas, hence a density dependent migration between reserve and outside 
area. The growth in the reserve area is described in (2), and is equivalent to (1), 
except that in the reserve there is no harvest. 
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Since we assume there is open access outside the reserve, (3) is set equal to zero, 
giving the standard open access stock size outside the reserve 
 
In the following we will assume that g(m)= vm, with v being a positive constant,  i.e. 
the habitat effects of reserve size are directly proportional to the reserve share m of 
the total area.  For the marine reserve case without habitat effects, v is set equal to 
zero. 
 
The open access and private property regimes can be modeled as follows. The 
biomass is here defined as X, as we only have one area, and the other parameters are 
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giving standard private property results for the whole area. 
 
For the open access case, we set (3) equals to zero, giving standard open access 




Carrying capacity is normalized; i.e. K =1, as is unit price, p=1. Intrinsic growth rate r 





The results show the open access and private property regimes to be lower and upper 
bounds, respectively, for yield in the marine reserve case. But, once habitat effects in 
reserves are allowed, the private property case no longer functions as an upper bound 
for yield at all closure levels. 
 
As we see in Figure 1, the habitat effect is positive as one would expect, given that v 
is positive. When compared to the marine reserve case without habitat effects, as the 
size of the marine reserve increases, the increasing habitat effect increases the stock. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 are for a low habitat effect of v=0.2. This value is chosen as it 
gives the minimum value of v for which the marine reserve can match the optimal 
management regime, when z=0.3. For v=0.2 the reserve must have a size of 
approximately 75% of the total area in order for the harvest to be as large as under the 
private property regime. This means that the increase in the carrying capacity in this 
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case is 15%. By increasing v, the minimum reserve size that matches the harvest in 
the optimal management case is reduced, as shown in Figure 3. In this figure v=0.4 
and the minimum reserve size that gives harvest matching the case of optimal 
management is approximately 60% of the total area, implying an increase in the 
carrying capacity of 24%.  
 
Applying v=0.4 and a 60% reserve, we observe in Figure 4, as expected, that the stock 
situation is improved with carrying capacity improvement due to reserve size.  This 
improvement wears off, however, as migration z increases. Looking at the equivalent 
for catch in Figure 5, we see that harvest is not affected as drastically as the stock by 





Comparing to conventional models with purely density dependent gains from marine 
reserves, it is shown that relatively limited carrying capacity improvements as a result 
of reserve size give increases in stock and harvest.  Private property results are 
emulated for reserve sizes of approximately 75% of the total area when carrying 
capacity is increased by 15%. For increasing habitat effects, the smaller is the needed 
reserve to match the private property harvest and stock levels.  
 
Though it is unsure whether large carrying capacity increases as described above 
actually appear in marine environments, terrestrial reserves have been shown to have 
carrying capacities more than 20% greater per ha. than outside their borders (Song 
and Li 1995). Higher densities of fish within reserves than outside are found in many 
cases (see Attwood et al. 1997 and Halpern 2003 for overviews). It is however 
unclear whether this is due to reserve implementation or the fact that reserves are 
often established in more attractive habitats (Garcia-Charton and Perez-Ruzafa 1999), 
as data has to a large degree not been available. Furthermore, when closing heavily 
harvested areas, the consequences for the areas outside may be detrimental, hence 
unless managed, reducing the carrying capacities outside the reserve. And even when 
increases in density within reserves are shown to follow reserve implementation, this 
does not necessarily imply that carrying capacity has increased, as this would depend 
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on how large the population was originally relative to carrying capacity. Nonetheless 
ecological research increasingly stresses ecosystem effects on single species, and 
underlines the fact that these issues should be taken into account. The results given 
here support this, as positive habitat effects as a result of marine reserve 
implementation are shown to have a potential to match private property harvest. This 
underlines the need to take into account broader ecological effects in the ecological-
economic modelling of marine reserves. 
 
Summarising the economic research so far, it is safe to say that economists in general 
underline the dangers of assuming marine reserves to be a panacea for fisheries 
management. Marine reserves must be seen as one of the many tools of fisheries 
management, and the how, where and for what fisheries, reserves are implemented is 
of great concern. Economists underline the political problems of reserve 
implementation, due to diverging economic interests in the relevant areas, and 
illustrate the sometimes conflicting economic and biological goals in the use of 
marine reserves in fisheries management. However, the economic analysis of marine 
reserves is still in its infancy, demanding much further study in a wide range of topics, 
where economic analysis may illustrate the shortcomings of the purely ecological 
modelling, and ecological modelling can illustrate where more encompassing 
ecological models, compared to those applied by economists, may affect the results 
with regard to marine reserve implementation. 
 
Looking at fisheries management, we can see an evolutionary path leading from input 
controls such as gear and time restrictions to output controls such as TAC and more 
disaggregated quota limitations. Economists have for years (starting with Gordon, 
1954) pointed to the fact that management focus purely on the biological and 
technological side of fisheries will result in inefficient fisheries, where the potential 
economic rent is eaten up by increased fishing capacity. Economists have traditionally 
espoused economic incentive systems for management, such as output taxation, or 
more commonly individual transferable quotas (ITQs). However, experience shows 
that such management options have not eliminated stock decline (see Iceland’s cod 
stock decline a few years back, and the recent experiences with New Zealand’s Hoki 
as well as other species). Indeed this was not the aim of ITQs as such, as efficiency 
was the main focus, and in this ITQs may well have succeeded (Hannesson, 2004). 
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The next evolutionary step, however, seems to be a return to input control in 
managing the stock, but this time in a more perfect form; permanent area closures, or 
marine reserves. There is however a danger of marine reserves faring as poorly as 
ITQs. Not because either management option necessarily is detrimental, but that 
knowledge, control and degree of implementation is imperfect, hence leading to poor 
results which colour perceptions of the management option negatively (Dayton et al. 
2000). Hence there is a great need for increased knowledge within a broad range of 
academic disciplines in order to better understand the many consequences of marine 
reserves.  
 
Here it seems clear that research that is truly multidisciplinary, i.e. also with regards 
to the researchers collaborating would be advantageous. Economists working in the 
field of bioeconomics accept criticism from ecologists for their use of simplistic 
ecological models, such as the one applied here for expositional purposes. The 
economist defence is however that with the additional complexity of economics on 
top of for instance cohort models, the creation of a “big black box” is imminent, 
rendering constructive analysis minimal10. Hence most bioeconomic models of marine 
reserves are so-called Gordon-Schaefer biomass models (with some exceptions such 
as Holland and Brazee 1996 and Sumaila 2002) and also most often one-species 
models (here Boncoeur et al. 2002 and Reithe 2006 are the only exceptions as of yet), 
and are usually designed to analyse specific general issues. In fisheries, multi-species 
management issues brought to a fore that economics was needed in conjunction with 
biology, in order to somehow weight the different interacting species. The complexity 
of the biology involved, increased by the addition of economics may be why there is 
so little multi-species bioeconomic analysis carried out in fisheries. It is however 
clear, in the same way that multi-species approaches require greater interaction 
between the disciplines, ecosystem approaches have the same requirement. When 
bringing several, sometimes competing species, as well as habitats, into the analysis, 
some form of valuation is required for determining optimal human utilisation, hence 
economics is required. However, a limited presentation of the ecology may mask the 
full effects of human interactions with the ecosystem, hence requiring greater 
                                                          
10 This defence does however only seem to be valid for economists, as ecologists have to a greater 
degree accepted that model construction and analysis cannot be done using simple Gordon-Schaefer 
type models. 
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ecological involvement.  It remains to be seen whether the multi-disciplinary research 
which one would have expected to emanate from multi-species management issues 
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Figure 1. Effects on stock of varying reserve size m with carrying capacity positively 
























Figure 2. Effects on catch of varying reserve size m, with carrying capacity positively 
























































Figure 3. Effects on catch of varying reserve size m, with carrying capacity positively 



























Figure 4. Effects on stock of varying migration rate z, with carrying capacity 













































Figure 5. Effects on catch of varying migration rate z with carrying capacity positively 
affected by m (m = 0.65, v=0. 4) 
